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The purpose of this paper is to contribute to an understanding of the intricate relationship between 
audit regulation and developments in audit practice in relation to the fraud issue. The extent and exact 
nature of the responsibilities of the auditor to detect fraud in relation to audit engagements has been 
widely discussed over the years. In this paper we classify actual cases, where the responsibilities of audi-
tors have been established by the court system and/or by the auditors own professional organizations 
in Denmark. The dataset includes all publicized cases raised against Danish auditors within the time 
period 1909-2006. The information provided in the cases provides a basis for identifying the actual 
responsibilities pertaining to fraud during the audit. The overall finding of the historical analysis is that 
the responsibilities of the auditor in relation to fraud should be interpreted not as a group of its own, 








Fraud, auditor responsibility, intentional misstatements, misappropriation, fraudulent reporting, embez-
zlement. - 3 - 
1. Introduction 
 
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to an understanding of the intricate relationship between 
audit regulation and developments in audit practice for the purpose of understanding current responsi-
bilities of the auditor in relation to fraud. The contribution of this paper involves insight into an audit 
market with a historical tradition for mandatory audits of not only listed companies, but all limited li-
ability companies. The institutional setup has allowed insight into fraud cases, where the auditor’s re-
sponsibility has been questioned for a time period which reaches back to the start of the audit profes-
sion in the beginning of the last century.  
 
One current interpretation of the auditor’s responsibilities in relation to fraud can be found in the re-
vised audit statement on the auditor’s report ISA 700. The auditor’s responsibility is described as part 
of the audit report, i.e. the following illustration is provided in ISA 700, section 60:  
 
“Auditor’s Responsibility:  
Our responsibility is to express an opinion on these financial statements based on our audit. 
We conducted our audit in accordance with International Standards on Auditing. Those 
standards require that we comply with ethical requirements and plan and perform the audit 
to obtain reasonable assurance whether the financial statements are free from material 
misstatement.  
 
An audit involves performing procedures to obtain audit evidence about the amounts and 
disclosures in the financial statements. The procedures selected depend on the auditor’s 
judgment, including the assessment of the risks of material misstatement of the financial 
statements, whether due to fraud or error. In making those risk assessments, the auditor 
considers internal control relevant to the entity’s preparation and fair presentation of the fi-
nancial statements in order to design audit procedures that are appropriate in the circum-- 4 - 
stances, but not for the purpose of expressing an opinion on the effectiveness of the entity’s 
internal control (emphasis added by authors)”. 1 
 
From the viewpoint of the users of financial statements this is often read as “it is the auditor’s respon-
sibility that the financial statements are free from (material) misstatements whether due to fraud or er-
ror”. Yet, in the vision paper provided by the CEOs of the six international audit networks the problem 
is clearly recognized: “Perhaps no single issue is the subject of more confusion, yet is more important, 
than the nature of the obligation of auditors to detect fraud”, (Vision paper, November 2006, p.12). We 
aim to diminish this confusion by examining the relationship between audit regulation and develop-
ments in audit practice in relation to the fraud issue. 
 
In this paper we examine and classify cases, where the responsibilities of auditors have been established 
by the court system and/or by the auditors´ own professional organizations. The information provided 
in the actual cases provides a basis for identifying the actual responsibility to recognize potential fraud 
situations during the audit and the responsibilities to react upon such knowledge. While the contribu-
tion of court systems in accounting studies been identified as being very important, it is also a relative 
ignored source of information for research purposes (Mills and Young, p. 244). The examination is also 
interesting in a time perspective, because many of the cases predate the recent promulgations national 
and international standard setters (i.e. IFAC). The promulgations have increased the awareness toward 
the auditor responsibility of identifying and reporting on (potential) fraud matters.   
 
The overall finding of the historical analysis is that the responsibilities of the auditor in relation to fraud 
should be interpreted in line with the development of what constitutes a good audit. In the responsum, 
tribunal and court cases the criticism against the auditor has been based on shortcomings of the audits 
                                                 
1 Effective for auditor’s reports dated on or after December 31, 2006. - 5 - 
either in the form of inappropriate/insufficient audit tasks or related to failures of communication. The 
auditor is never reprimanded or punished for not detecting frauds as such, but criticism is raised when-
ever audits have been found to be below standard. The development in sanctions and civil liabilities 
confirms that the court system is now considering fraud as a normal, although unusual, business sce-
nario towards which the auditor has proactive responsibilities when planning and conducting the audit.  
  
In the next section, we provide the motivation for the study and discuss prior literature on fraud issues. 
In section 3, the background for interpreting the historical account is provided in two subsections. The 
first subsection describes the Danish legal and collegiate system as a background for the development 
of the audit regulation and for understanding fraud cases. The second subsection describes the meth-
odology applied in attaining, classifying and analysing the actual fraud cases. The historical account for 
the changes in the auditor’s responsibilities in relation to fraud is provided in the three subsections of 
section 4. The paper is concluded in section 5.  
 
 
2. Motivation and literature review 
 
In this section we provide the motivation for the paper and discuss previous literature on fraud. The 
extent and exact nature of the responsibilities of the auditor to detect fraud in relation to audit engage-
ments has been widely discussed over the years. An illustration is provided by the continuous update of 
pertinent audit standards in the US, i.e., SAS 53 (AICPA 1988), 82 (AICPA 1997) and 99 (AICPA 
2002). The auditor’s responsibility in relation to fraud is an issue that has gained even more attention in 
recent years. This is due not least to the collapse of Enron and other corporate scandals, which have 
contributed heavily to a decrease in the trust in auditors by users of financial statements and the public 
in general. As early as 1996, the Commission of the European Communities pointed out in the green - 6 - 
paper on the role, the position, and the liability of the statutory auditor within the European Union that 
the public expects the auditor to have a role in protecting the interests of shareholders, creditors, and 
other stakeholders by providing assurance regarding the existence of fraud (EU Commission, 1996). 
The Commission also pointed out that this expectation is contributing to the so-called expectation gap 
between auditors and users of financial statements.  
 
The expectation gap related to fraud has proved hard to close, see Nieschwietz, Schultz and Zimbel-
man (2000, 192). We contend that this is probably related to the fine distinction between the auditor’s 
responsibility to “detect” or “react” to financial misstatements. From the auditor’s point of view the 
assurance service provided is based on a less than full examination of the evidential matter, hence the 
potential observations of fraudulent behaviour hinge on the materiality level for the particular engage-
ment. This problem has been examined by Braun (2000) by looking at the effect of time pressure as 
explaining the auditor’s main focus on the regular audit acts as opposed to attention towards less fre-
quent fraudulent behaviour. In addition, an assessment of high fraud risk is not necessarily the same as 
fraud being committed. Due to confidentiality issues, the auditor is especially placed in a precarious 
situation when faced with a suspicion of fraud committed by management or those charged with gov-
ernance, see Bloomfield (1997) on strategic dependence, and Newman, Patterson and Smith (2001) on 
the dynamic interaction between auditor and auditee. From the users point of view the distinction be-
tween detecting fraud and reacting to observed fraud is obscured by the lack of understanding of the 
role of an auditor. Difference in expectations has been observed in terms of the perceived level of as-
surance for fraud detection with higher levels expected by users than by auditors, e.g., Goldwasser 
(2005), Epstein and Geiger (1994). 
 
The increased attention to fraud issues applies not only to regulators but also to academics. Thus the 
auditor’s responsibility in relation to fraud and hence the auditor’s detection of fraud is an issue that has - 7 - 
been – and still is – attracting an increasing amount of research. Nieschwietz, Schultz, and Zimbelman 
(2000) provide a comprehensive review of the empirical research. They state that their review is war-
ranted primarily because policy makers, academics, government officials, and practising auditors have 
debated the auditor’s responsibility for detecting fraud for several decades (Nieschwietz, Schultz, and 
Zimbelman, 2000, p. 190).  
 
Pany and Whittington (2001), starting from the recommendations from the Panel on Audit Effective-
ness, provide insight into a number of auditing standard issues. They state that research on fraud has 
generally found that auditors differ in judgments about the amount of fraud risk signalled by different 
red flag indicators, i.e. fraud risk factors that more sophisticated decision models are found to improve 
auditors’ ability to distinguish the risk of fraud, and that auditors modify overall audit plans and audit 
programmes in response to assessments of fraud risk in different ways (Pany and Whittington,2001, pp. 
404-405). Similar conclusions can be drawn from the review of prior studies by Nieschwietz, Schultz, 
and Zimbelman (2000), and from more recent studies, e.g. post-SAS 82 studies in the US by Knapp 
and Knapp (2001), Glover et al. (2003), Lynford and Bedard (2003), and Mock and Turner (2005). 
 
Fraser and Lin (2004, pp. 166-168) outline the academic discussion and prior research of the potential 
impact of audit standards on actual auditor behaviour. In a two country experimental set up involving 
UK and Canada they find that auditors do take the detailed prescription of standards into account, 
when considering their responsibilities for the detection of clients´ illegal acts, Fraser and Lin (2004, p. 
178). In line with the critical viewpoint of the potential impact of audit standards Wilks and Zimbelman 
(2004) uses a game theory perspective to develop recommendations for improving current audit stan-
dards. They propose that due to the strategic nature of fraud, audit policymakers should replace stan-
dards that inhibit auditors’ strategic reasoning (e.g., emphasis on lists of fraud cues) with standards that - 8 - 
encourage strategic reasoning (e.g., persuade auditors to consider how management might manipulate 
their perceptions of fraud cues), Wilks and Zimbelman (2004,  p. 182).  
 
Part of the studies on fraud has dealt with the issue from the viewpoint of audit failures. This literature 
primary concerns litigation and enforcement activities of supervisory bodies such as SEC in the United 
States, e.g., Bonner, Palmrose and Young (1998), Rollins and Bremser (1997), Campbell and Parker 
(1992). In an analysis of 415 SEC releases from 1972 to 1989 Campbell and Parker (1992) identified 
several important issues in relation to fraud. The large majority of cases in which the SEC associated 
the auditor with fraud (recklessness) involved smaller audit firms, whereas the large majority of cases of 
management fraud involved large audit firms, see Campbell and Parker (1992, 308-309). Similarly, 
Rollins and Bremser (1997) examined 309 SEC releases from 1982 to 1991. One of their findings was 
an inverse relationship between the relative number of cases where auditors were disciplined and the 
audit firm size. In effect, Big Six firms were disciplined less often than national and local firms in rela-
tion to accounting violations by clients, Rollins and Bremser (1997, p. 198). Finally, the litigation risk 
has been tied in to the SEC releases in the study by Bonner, Palmrose and Young (1998). The study 
provides a very useful taxonomy of 12 general categories of fraud.
 The taxonomy is based on prior aca-
demic and practice related literature combined with categories applied in actual SEC releases. They 
found that auditors are more likely to be sued over more frequently occurring frauds (such as prema-
ture revenue recognition) and fictitious transactions frauds (such as fictitious revenues). From the 261 
companies examined in this study (SEC releases from the period 1982 to 1995), 42% have no litigation, 
38% have auditor litigation and 20% have other litigation, Bonner, Palmrose and Young (1998, p. 513). 
One implication suggested by Bonner, Palmrose and Young (1998, 527) is that “litigation alone is not 
sufficient for deterrence of fraudulent financial reporting”, i.e., leaving a non-neglectable role for audit 
regulation. 
 - 9 - 
Regulation through audit standards has proved to provide useful “common knowledge” in the com-
munities of academics and practice alike. Hence, for the purpose of this study the ISA 240 (revised) is 
used as the present benchmark for a historical examination of the auditors’ responsibility in relation to 
fraud. ISA 240 (revised) refines the concept of fraud by introducing a number of important distinc-
tions. First, fraud may be divided into management fraud and employee fraud. Management fraud is 
defined as fraud involving one or more members of the management or those charged with govern-
ance, whereas employee fraud is defined as fraud involving only employees. It is emphasized that, in 
either case, there may be collusion with third parties outside the company. Second, fraud may be di-
vided into fraudulent financial reporting and misappropriation of assets. These are the two overall types 
of fraud that are relevant to the auditor’s considerations. Fraudulent financial reporting is defined as 
intentional misstatements or omissions of amounts or disclosures in financial statements intended to 
deceive users of financial statements. Misappropriation of assets, on the other hand, is defined as theft 
of a company’s assets.
2 
3 Compared to the distinction between management fraud and employee fraud, 
cases of fraudulent financial reporting are often, but not exclusively, management frauds, whereas cases 
with misappropriations of assets are often, but not exclusively, employee frauds. Finally, ISA 240 (re-
vised) summarizes what popularly has been termed “the fraud triangle”, namely involving three interre-
lated elements: (1) incentives or pressures to commit fraud, (2) perceived opportunity to do so, and (3) 
some rationalization of the act on behalf of the perpetrator. The distinctions identified from ISA 240 
(revised) are used as a way to classify actual fraud cases in a historical perspective, thus providing po-
tential descriptive characteristics on type of fraud perpetrator, type of fraud, and concrete elements in 
accordance with the fraud triangle. 
 
                                                 
2 As examples of misappropriation of assets, the standard mentions (1) embezzling receipts, (2) stealing physical or intellec-
tual property, (3) causing an entity to pay for goods and services not received, or (4) using an entity’s assets for personal use. 
It is emphasized that, in order to conceal the fact that assets are missing, misappropriation of assets is often accompanied by 
false or misleading records or documents. 
3 It is important not to confuse the term ‘theft’ used in this definition with the legal term ‘theft’ which is a more narrow term 
than misappropriation of assets. - 10 - 
Studies involving enforcement activities of professional accountant bodies are, however, extremely rare 
although these bodies are engrained in most institutional systems as part of national Accounting Asso-
ciations (Chartered Accountants in Australia, in Ireland, in UK etc.). In addition, litigation environ-
ments outside US seem to be less aggressive. However this is probably not only due to few committed 
and/or detected frauds. The relatively infrequent nature of fraud (a maybe even more scars detection of 
fraud) makes empirical examination of the area more difficult, Nieschwietz, Schultz and Zimbelman 
(2000). While the auditor’s responsibility in relation to fraud may be relatively unchanged in principle, 
the always present situational circumstances seem to have clouted the ability to reach consensus on the 
actual responsibilities of the auditor. Hence, the intended examination of actual cases with analysis of 
the content and categorisation of shared properties becomes a highly relevant and data-rich setting in 
comparison. 
 
The nature of auditing may be described as a practice-oriented endeavour. Hence, audit regulation has 
often been a codification of established good audit behaviour (Wilks & Zimbelman 2004) and “nudged 
along” by enforcement activities (Campbell and Parker 1992). It is in this context that the responsibility 
of the auditor to detect fraud has evolved over time. Peecher et. al. (2007, p. 464) suggests that auditing 
approaches evolve endogenously in response to changes in society’s information needs, regulations, 
business organization’s value creation-processes and available accounting and audit technologies. In a 
similar manner, it is our contention that the responsibilities manifested in audit regulation have func-
tioned in a symbiotic relation with actual practice, courtroom rulings on litigation cases and disciplinary 
actions from professional and supervisory bodies subject to institutional differences in individual coun-
tries. Hence, the research question is raised as follows.  
 
RQ: How has the auditor’s responsibility in relation to fraud developed over time? 
 - 11 - 
In order to shed light on this question we examine actual cases involving the auditors’ responsibilities in 
relation to fraud raised within the institutional audit environment of Denmark. The contribution of this 
paper involves insight into an interesting audit market with a historical tradition for mandatory audits 
of not only listed companies, but all limited liability companies. The institutional setup has allowed in-
sight into fraud cases, where the auditor’s responsibility has been questioned for a time period which 
reaches back to the start of the audit profession in the beginning of the last century.  
 
 
3. Examining fraud cases in Denmark 
 
The purpose of this section is to provide a short overview of the Danish legal system and describe the 
methodology applied in attaining and classifying the attributes found in the actual fraud cases. 
 
 
3.1. The Danish legal system 
 
This section provides an overview of the Danish legal system, i.e., the Danish institutional environment 
regarding professional organizations, standard setters, and courts. The section only provides an over-
view of this institutional environment, i.e., a description of the institutional environment that is suffi-
cient with regard to the analysis of fraud cases later in the paper. Thus the section does not provide an 
exhaustive description of the institutional environment.
4 An overview of the pertinent collegiate bodies 
and legal system is provided in figure 1. 
 
                                                 
4 Holm and Warming-Rasmussen (2006) provide an overview of auditing in Denmark. Similarly, Christiansen (1993a) 
Christiansen (1993b), Elling (1993), and Hansen and Sørensen (2003) provide an overview of accounting in Denmark. This 
literature is all in English. - 12 - 
In Denmark, there are two types of auditors: State Authorized Public Accountants and Certified Public 
Accountants
5. As a main rule, companies, i.e. limited liability companies, are always required to prepare 
their financial statements in accordance with the Danish Financial Statements Act. Also, as a main rule, 
companies that are required to prepare their financial statements in accordance with this Act are always 
required to have their financial statements audited by one or more auditors. Before April 1, 2006, this 
was not the main rule, but the only rule. Thus, before that date, companies that were required to pre-
pare their financial statements in accordance with the Financial Statements Act were always required to 
have their financial statements audited by one or more auditors.
6 However, since that date, companies 
that are required to prepare their financial statements in accordance with the Financial Statements Act 
are not required to have their financial statements audited by one or more auditors, if they do not ex-
ceed certain limits.
7 Only State Authorized and Certified Public Accountants are allowed to carry out 
statutory auditing. Thus companies that are required to prepare their financial statements in accordance 
with the Financial Statements Act and have their financial statements audited by one or more auditors 
are required to have their financial statements audited by one or more State Authorized or Certified 
Public Accountants. Furthermore, state-owned or listed companies are required to have their financial 
statements audited by at least one State Authorized Public Accountant. For this and other reasons, 
State Authorized Public Accountants dominate the audit market in Denmark. 
 
                                                 
5 The number of State Authorized Public Accountants is approximately 2000 and the number of Certified Public Account-
ants is approximately 3000. In comparison the entire Danish Population is approximately 5.4 million people.. 
6 Before December 31, 2004, state-owned and listed companies or other types of enterprises were required to have their 
financial statements audited by two auditors, i.e., two auditors from two different audit firms, see §165, paragraph 6. This 
requirement has been abolished so that even state-owned and listed companies are now required to have their financial 
statements audited by one or more auditors. 
7 Specifically, companies that are required to prepare their financial statements in accordance with the rules in reporting class 
B are not required to have their financial statements audited by one or more auditors if they do not exceed two of the fol-
lowing limits as at the balance sheet date in two consecutive financial years: (1) a balance sheet total of DKK 1.5 mio., (2) 
revenue of DKK 3 mio., and (c) an average number of 12 full-time employees during the financial year.  - 13 - 
Most State Authorized Public Accountants are members of the Institute of Certified Public Account-
ants (Foreningen af Statsautoriserede Revisorer – FSR).
8 This institute consists of a number of profes-
sional committees. Three of the most important of these committees are the Accounting Committee, 
the Auditing Committee, and the Responsum Committee.  
 
<Insert “Figure 1. Fraud cases considered in the collegiate bodies and legal system” about here>  
 
The responsibility of the Accounting Committee is to develop accounting standards. These standards 
are inspired by the international accounting standards (International Accounting Standards – 
IAS/International Financial Reporting Standards – IFRS) that are issued by the International Account-
ing Standards Board (IASB). The responsibility of the Auditing Committee is to develop auditing 
standards (revisionsstandarder – RS). These standards are based on the international auditing standards 
(International Standards on Auditing – ISA) that are issued by the International Auditing and Assur-
ance Standards Board (IAASB) of the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC). In fact, the 
Danish standards are verbatim translations of the international standards except for any special provi-
sions in the Danish legislation which are added to the international standards. Many of these provisions 
are found in the Financial Statements Acts. However, many of the provisions are also found in other 
acts, e.g. the Auditors and Companies Acts. 
 
Finally, the responsibility of the Responsum Committee is to make expert opinions (“responsa”) re-
garding “good auditor practice”.
9 This concept of “good auditor practice” originates from the Danish 
Auditors Act. One of the central provisions in this Act provides that the auditor is “the public repre-
sentative” or “the public watchdog” when performing audits or other types of engagements that are 
                                                 
8 Similarly, most Certified Public Accountants are members of the Institute of Certified Public Accountants (Foreningen af 
Registrerede Revisorer – FRR). 
9 The Responsum Committee has the authority to make expert opinions regarding ’good auditor practice’ whether the audi-
tor involved is a member of FSR or not. FRR has its own Responsum Committee. - 14 - 
comprised by the Act. This provision also provides that the auditor must perform audits and other 
types of engagements that are comprised by the Act in accordance with “good auditor practice”. Thus 
the concept of “good auditor practice” originates from the Auditors Act. However, the concept is a 
general clause that is supplemented not only by this Act, but also by other acts and other types of regu-
lation, e.g. the Danish auditing standards. This hierarchy of the auditor’s responsibility in relation to 
“good audit practice” is indicated in figure 2. Furthermore, the concept is also supplemented by re-
sponsa from the Responsum Committee, disciplinary decisions from the Disciplinary Tribunal and 
judgments from the courts in the regular court system, i.e. the third level in figure 2.  
 
<Insert “Figure 2. The regulatory hierarchy of auditor’s responsibility for “good audit practice”” about 
here>. 
 
Compared to the Disciplinary Tribunal and the courts, it is important to be aware of the fact that the 
Responsum Committee cannot impose any sanctions on an auditor. Thus only the Disciplinary Tribu-
nal and the courts can impose sanctions on an auditor. Admittedly, the Responsum Committee makes 
experts opinions regarding “good auditor practice”, but it is up to the Disciplinary Tribunal and/or the 
courts to decide if any sanctions should be imposed on an auditor. Furthermore, neither the Discipli-
nary Tribunal nor the courts are obliged to request a responsum from the Responsum Committee when 
deciding whether to impose any sanctions on an auditor or not.  
 
As identified in figure 1 there are three types of legal liability for auditors: (1) disciplinary liability, (2) 
civil liability (or liability to pay damages), and (3) criminal liability. Cases of disciplinary liability are han-
dled by the Disciplinary Tribunal and from 1967 to 2002 by the Accountants Tribunal as a court of 
appeal. The Accountants Tribunal is now abolished and only the Disciplinary Tribunal constitutes the 
disciplinary system. Cases of civil or criminal liability, on the other hand, are handled by the courts in - 15 - 
the regular court system. In Denmark, there are three levels of courts in the regular court system. The 
first level consists of a number of District Courts. Most cases start out at this level. The second level 
consists of two High Courts. Many cases, especially more serious ones, also start out at this level. Fi-
nally, the third level consists of a Supreme Court. The Supreme Court is only functioning as a court of 
appeal. Thus no cases start out at this level. As a main rule, it is only possible to appeal a judgment 
once, i.e. either from one of the District Courts to one of the two High Courts (if the case starts out at 
the first level) or from one of two High Courts to the Supreme Court (if the case starts out at the sec-
ond level). 
 
As previously mentioned only the Disciplinary Tribunal and the courts can impose sanctions on an 
auditor. The number of fraud cases considered in this paper has been classified in figure 1 in accor-
dance with type of sanction. Disciplinary liability can result in different sanctions depending on the 
severity of the offence and other circumstances. These sanctions include a warning, a fine, or a suspen-
sion of the license to practice as an auditor. Similarly, criminal liability can result in different sanctions 
depending on the severity of the offence, the provision that is violated, and other circumstances.
10 
These sanctions include a fine, an imprisonment or – similar to disciplinary liability – a suspension of 
the license to practice as an auditor. Civil liability cannot result in any sanctions as such. Rather, in cases 
of civil liability, the plaintiff seeks to claim damages from the defendant, i.e. the auditor. Thus civil li-
ability assumes that the plaintiff has suffered an economic loss, e.g. because the auditor has been negli-
gent in performing an audit or another type of engagement. 
 
                                                 
10 Many of the criminal provisions – in particular the most ”serious” ones – are found in the Criminal Code. However, 
criminal provisions – in particular the less ”serious” ones – are also found in other acts, e.g., the Financial Statements Act 
(§164), the Auditors Act (§27) and the Companies Act (§§160-61). - 16 - 
 
3.2. Methodology and overview of the actual fraud cases 
 
In this section we provide a description of the methodology applied in identifying and recognizing per-
tinent facts during the examination of the cases. The 83 fraud cases considered in this study are such 
cases where the responsibility of the auditor has been questioned. It includes all the cases which have 
been made publicly available within the time period from1909 to 2006. Due to the relationship between 
the institutions involved, the same case is sometimes handled more than once, i.e. the number of 
unique fraud cases considered in this paper is 72. It should be considered that the list of cases is not 
exhaustive in terms of fraud cases raised within the court system in Denmark and certainly not in terms 
of the number of criminal offences committed. In fact, many fraud cases do not lead to questions being 
raised as to the particular responsibilities of the auditor
11. Due to the interest in examining the auditor’s 
responsibility over time, only fraud cases involving the auditor are examined. An overview of the type 
of actual fraud cases considered is provided in the flowchart in figure 3. Here a distinction is made be-
tween responsum cases and tribunal or court cases.  
 
<Insert “Figure 3. Flowchart of fraud cases considered” about here> 
 
In total 53 fraud cases have been identified from the total set of 1250 responsum cases handled over 
time by the responsum committee. As a first step these cases were identified through a thorough word 
search using several different combinations of words like fraud, criminal act etc. As depicted by the 
flowchart some, but not all the fraud responsa, have been used by the tribunals or courts. As a next 
step the fraud responsa were examined in detail. It should be noted that any particular responsum typi-
cally addresses more than one issue pertaining to the responsibility of the auditor. Most of the issues 
                                                 
11 In comparison the MARC “Classification and Analysis of Major European Business Studies” (2005) identified 21 of 60 
business failures as involving the role of the auditor. - 17 - 
raised involve concrete scenarios which provide insight in relation to whether the auditor has con-
ducted the mandated tasks in a manner which is in accordance with “good auditor practice”. Whether 
the auditor has received critic from the responsum committee is also identified in the flowchart, i.e. 37 
of the 53 cases in figure 3. Criticism raised in the responsum may lead to sanctions on the auditor, but 
it is not necessarily the outcome in the tribunal or court systems.  
 
An additional 30 fraud cases have been identified from the tribunal (19) and court systems (11). We 
have only considered public available cases, where questions are raised in relation to the responsibility 
of the auditor in fraud settings. The flowchart demonstrates that ten of the fraud cases have been con-
sidered as responsum cases before ending up as tribunal or court cases. The remaining 20 cases have 
been raised without obtaining the professional commentary from the responsum committee. Because 
the courts do need to arrive at an interpretation of the auditors’ responsibilities, the responsum may be 
a useful instrument. An example of the importance of responsum is observed in one of the court cases. 
Here two of the three judges stated that the absence of a responsum pertaining to the specific area is 
precluding them from finding the auditor responsible in violating “good practice”, court case 6 (1997,  
p. 1798).    
 
Each of the 83 fraud cases has been examined in detail in order to be able to identify any patterns de-
veloping over time. In addition to the detailed information in the individual fraud cases, a data set has 
been constructed. The total data identifies 18 variables of classification and 15 descriptive variables. 
The classifications are tied to the case material in different ways. The main classifications used in this 
paper include: 
 
a)  Type of case document (responsum, tribunal, court) 
b)  Time of origin for case document (1909-1970, 1970-1996, 1996-2006) - 18 - 
c)  Type of perpetrators (management, employee, management and employee in collusion, external 
party, internal and external party in collusion) 
d)  ISA 240 fraud classification (fraudulent reporting, misappropriation of assets, concealment/ 
combination of the two) 
e)  Criticism of auditor (yes/no) 
f)  Type of criticism (none, insufficient or inappropriate audit tasks, communication failures, both 
audit task and communication failures) 
g)  Type of liability (disciplinary, civil, criminal) 
h)  Type of sanction (none, warning, fine, liability amount, imprisonment, suspension) 
 
 
When the 72 unique fraud cases are tabulated it is possible to discern relationships between type of 
frauds and type of perpetrators, see table 1. First, it may be observed that fraudulent reporting is a 
management deed (11 of 11 cases). Second, concealment of misappropriation of assets is involved in 
most of the cases (50 of 72), when the responsibility of the auditor is questioned. As identified in ISA 
240 fraud often involves carefully organized schemes designed to conceal it.12 Pure cases of misappro-
priation of assets are rare for obvious reasons – the perpetrator does not want to be caught. Third, con-
cealment is chosen by both management and employees when placed in situations, where the opportu-
nity arises. Fourth, only a few of the raised cases involve collusion by more parties (one with internal 
and one with external) or pure theft from an external party (here two situations with bankers). This 
suggests that most of the fraud cases raised in this context involve typical auditor situations. 
 
<insert “Table 1. Fraud types and perpetrators (unique cases)” about here> 
                                                 
12 As examples of such schemes, the standard mentions (1) forgery, (2) deliberate failure to record transactions, and (3) 
intentional misrepresentations being made to the auditor. - 19 - 
 
 
4. The auditor’s responsibility in relation to fraud 
 
This section provides an analysis of the auditor’s responsibility in relation to fraud on the basis of the 
actual fraud cases and the relevant regulation. The analysis is divided into three time periods. The first 
time period is the period from the beginning of the previous century until around 1970. This period is 
without audit regulation pertaining to the auditor’s responsibilities in relation to fraud. It is a relatively 
long period dominated by actual fraud cases rather than regulation. In the second time period from 
1970 to 1996 the auditor’s reactive responsibilities are recognized in the general audit standards. Thus 
the transition from the first to the second time period reflects a codification of actual fraud cases into 
regulation. In the final time period from 1996 to 2006 the responsibilities are characterised as proactive 
in both the legislation and in the specific audit standards pertaining to fraud. The transition from the 
second to the third period also reflects a codification of international auditing standards into Danish 
auditing standards. An overview of the audit regulation and number of fraud cases in each time period 
is recognised in figure 4. This figure provides a timeline as a basis for the historical account of the audit 
regulation and examination of actual fraud cases in the three time periods.  
 
<insert “Figure 4. Timeline for audit regulation and fraud cases” about here.> 
 
 
4.1. Audit regulation and fraud cases in the time period before 1970  
 
The historical account for the responsibility of the auditor starts with a 60 year span without any fraud 
provisions in the audit regulation, see part I of the historical overview in figure 4. The first Auditors - 20 - 
Act was adopted as early as 1909. However, this Act did not contain any provisions that were relevant 
to the auditor’s responsibility in relation to fraud. A new Auditors Act was adopted in 1930. Compared 
to the 1909 Act, this Act contained very few new provisions and none of these provisions were relevant 
to the auditor’s responsibility in relation to fraud either. Furthermore, the 1930 Act was repealed as 
early as 1931, but the provisions from the Act were moved to a new Business Act and supplemented by 
an Executive Order on Auditors’ Activities, Duties, and Responsibilities in 1933.
13 A new Auditors Act 
was not adopted until 1967.
  
 
However, frauds were committed, and the auditors were expected to play a certain role in relation to 
solving frauds. In 1930 a new criminal code was introduced, and the implications for the auditors were 
discussed in the following years. The Copenhagen law professor Stephan Hurwitz was invited to speak 
on the role of the auditor at an annual assembly of the State Authorized Public Accountants. The 
manuscript titled “On enrichment and financial statements crimes” was also published in the profes-
sion magazine for the Danish auditors “Revision & Regnskabsvæsen” (Hurwitz, 1935). The message of 
the presentation was that “intent” by a perpetrator is a crucial legal criterion in order to establish the 
particular form of crime. The same “objective act” might point to different conclusions such as embez-
zlement, property damage or no criminal act at all. Because criminal intent is an internal psychological 
attribute of the perpetrator, the external objective act observable by the auditor can only be circumstan-
tial. Hence, the law professor cautions the auditors to be careful. Based on an examination of the books 
and accounts the auditors are not equipped to positively declare that fraud has occurred. Instead they 
should limit themselves to observe objective facts, i.e. that this or that has been found to be incorrect 
or missing and that this could be indicative of some criminal act (Hurwitz, 1935, p. 183).  
 
                                                 
13 An executive order is similar to an act. The only difference is that an act is prepared and adopted by the Danish parlia-
ment whereas an executive order is prepared and issued by public officials. However, public officials are only entitled to 
prepare executive orders under the provisions of an act. - 21 - 
This particular interpretation can be rediscovered in the proclaimed criticism of the auditor in respon-
sum case 29 (1935, p. 1, in translation):  
 
“However, in many cases it is natural that he [the auditor] obtains as much 
information as possible before he delivers his report; but sometimes it is 
even correct to raise criticism against the auditor if he seeks information di-
rectly from the person who has conducted fraud too early on, especially if 
the extent of the fraud is not fully clarified.” 
 
“The auditor’s task must always be to give an objective and impartial account 
of the circumstances that are mentioned in his report. Normally, he shall not 
pass judgment on the legal nature of the criticised actions.” 
  
Hence, the auditor was criticized in general terms. The message is that the auditor profession should 
refrain from making legal assessments on observed transgressions. The presumed fraud was tied to the 
sole accountant and suggested lack of appropriate bookkeeping and detainment of received payments.  
The same interpretation of the extent of the auditor’s responsibility could be found in Sweden at the 
same time. At the 4
th Scandinavian Auditor Congress in Stockholm the Swedish Authorised Auditor 
Sven Hagström made a very thorough description of the possible steps for the auditor in order to de-
tect fraudulent reporting. The presentation was published in the Danish profession magazine Revision 
& Regnskabsvæsen (1936, pp. 1-18). On the issue of the auditor’s responsibility in relation to fraud 
examinations, he suggested that if the examination should be used as a basis for a legal judgment, then 
the best course for the auditor would be to refrain from classifying identified errors from a legal stand-
point (Hagström, 1936, p. 17). Thus, the inspiration for the cited decision in responsum case 29 is clear. 
 - 22 - 
<Insert “Table 2. Number of Responsum cases (percentage with critic of auditor), perpetrators and 
time period” about here.> 
 
This is one of only 21 responsum cases on fraud provided in the time span from 1909 to 1970. The 
typical fraud case involved an employee as the sole perpetrator (13 cases), while 7 cases involved man-
agement as sole perpetrator, see table 2. Only one case identifies a fraud scenario with collusion be-
tween manager and employer. Criticism of the auditors was proclaimed in 52 percent of the fraud cases. 
This is a considerably lower proportion than for the later time periods, see table 2 for comparative fig-
ures. It is noticeable that no criticism was raised in the two responsa (117 and 179) later associated with 
court cases handled in this first time period. Responsum case 179 (1953, p. 2, in translation) provides 
the following explanation which does elucidate the absence of criticism in a number of fraud cases:  
 
“The purpose of a normal audit of financial statements is to examine the ac-
curacy of the financial statements. This includes that the auditor – depending 
on the type and organisation of the company – takes into consideration 
rather obvious possibilities for fraud. Only if the auditor comes across cir-
cumstances that must raise his suspicion he should extend his examination 
until he reaches an assurance about whether the suspicion is justified or un-
justified. History shows that fraud transactions that have happened once will 
repeat themselves with increasing frequency, and therefore the auditor relies 
on the fact that sooner or later and with ordinary scepticism he will normally 
come across circumstances that will lead to detection.” 
 
The public can be confident that most perpetrators will eventually compile enough transgressions to be 
noticeable. Therefore it is only a matter of time before the auditor will detect frauds in the natural - 23 - 
course of annual audits. In accordance with this assessment by the responsum committee the High 
Court acquitted the auditor (court case 2, 1955). In spite of the auditor’s knowledge about the lack of 
separation of duties at the client, he was not sanctioned by the court to pay damages. This is somewhat 
in contrast to the other court case in this time period (court case 1, 1951). In this case separation of 
duties for the cash register and bookkeeping was also weak. The auditor was sanctioned to pay damages 
because of his lack of supervision with this particular business cycle. However, the claimed damages by 
the prosecutor were lowered, because the court found that the own supervisory responsibility by the 
business manager had not been maintained sufficiently. That is, the importance of own control or in-
ternal control is considered by the court system to be a pertinent requisite for the task performed by 
the auditor.  
 
The reason for the importance of internal controls in relation to fraud prevention should be obvious. 
In an article of the time, one state authorized auditor (and lecturer at CopenhagenBusiness School ) 
stated that (Jensen 1953, p. 188, in translation): 
 
”As is well known, the vast majority of the frauds committed consist of 
withholdings [of payments from debtors]. Therefore the auditors must be 
particularly aware of this fact and seek to prevent any possibilities for this 
type of fraud or detect it as soon as possible when it is committed.”  
 
This is in line with a focus on the relationship between lack of controls and fraud opportunities in this 
time period. Another article from the profession magazine “Revision & Regnskabsvæsen” looked at the 
pertinent question: “Can frauds be prevented through internal controls”, Orreby, 1945. The article 
started with a message of a social conscious nature: (Orreby, 1945, pp. 255-256): 
 - 24 - 
“It is not only the cashier who assumes a responsibility, when he takes over 
the cash management. The company that hires the cashier also has a consid-
erable responsibility, i.e. the responsibility for the cashier’s moral. It is not 
right to expose a person to the temptations that are connected to the man-
agement of the cash of someone else without giving him or her the moral 
support of an effective control at the same time. The more difficult it is to 
have the cash at your disposal and the greater the risk that irregularities will 
be detected, the smaller are the temptations.” 
 
It is important not to tempt the person in charge of cash receipts and, as such, it is important to im-
plement the necessary control system in a company. This involves separation of duties and automatic 
controls ingrained in the work processes of the different employees. The article goes on to suggest 
more mechanic systems related to the payments like the American “imprest system” (payments related 
to a fixed amount for which the cash clerk is responsible). More concrete controls are suggested in the 
articles as related to the cash receipts, but the principle is implied for the entire administrative system 
(Orreby, 1945, p. 258, in translation):  
 
“Of course, the internal control shall not only take into consideration the 
cash management, but you should aim at such an organisation that errors oc-
curring in the accounting or the overall routine office work will be detected 
and corrected.” 
 
From a current perspective this is interesting, but what was the interpretation of internal controls at the 
time? Of course “separation of duties” and related controls were central. This would be in accordance 
with the reference to “internal checks” as distinctive from “the internal control system” made in the - 25 - 
KPMG´s publication “The 21
st Century Public Company Audit” (Bell et al. 2005, p. 7). Before the 1992 
COSO report the definition of internal control was hardly uniform (COSO, 1992). But even in the mid-
dle of the last century the definition extended to more than separation of duties. As an example, the 
Norwegian considerations on the auditors’ responsibilities were presented in the Danish magazine Re-
vision & Regnskabsvæsen –  in modern auditing you distinguish between internal control and external 
auditing: (Sommerschild (1937, p. 185, in translation): 
 
“Following a modern understanding of auditing, it is the responsibility of the 
external auditor to form a justified opinion about whether the internal con-
trol is properly organised. The auditor must know its structure thoroughly 
and must continually and in an unpredictable manner ascertain that the con-
trol system is being followed. If the auditor comes to the opinion that both 
the system itself and its implementation is first class, many details can be left 
to the internal control.” 
 
The responsibility of the auditor is separate from the supervisory responsibilities of the company. The 
nature of the responsibilities can be indicated by looking at the selected responsum fraud cases 172 and 
394. In Responsum case 172 (1952) the auditor was found free from criticism “even though” he waited 
half a year to follow up on his initial suspicion of fraud by an employee. The message is that it is not 
the auditor’s main task to detect fraud or even – as indicated in this situation – to react immediately 
upon fraud suspicions. In the later Responsum case 394 (1968, p. 2, in translation) involving an em-
ployee’s detainment of payments from debtors the responsum committee explained that:  
 
“It is usual for state authorised public accountants to review the company’s 
administrative procedures within the accounting areas at regular intervals. If - 26 - 
the auditor finds any circumstances that give cause for criticism during such 
a review, the auditor should draw the management’s attention to that fact.” 
 
This explanation summarizes the principle nature of the auditor’s responsibility as interpreted by the 
responsum committee. In this period the auditors were not only left to their own interpretation of good 
auditor behaviour. As demonstrated above frequent translations of articles from profession magazines 
in other countries were also published, especially from the neighbours of Sweden, Norway and Ger-
many. The international development in the audit profession was followed with keen interest. One of 
the articles of particular interest for the present purpose was entitled “Why do trusted persons commit 
fraud?” (Revision & Regnskabsvæsen, 1951/52). This was a translation of an article in The Journal of 
Accountancy by professor in Sociology Donald R. Cressey. He suggested a scientific approach toward 
identifying a set of conditions for fraudulent behaviour. Cressey had collected empirical data through 
interviews with the entire population of fraudulent criminals imprisoned in the Illinois state penitentiary 
in Joliet (USA). His “theoretical formula” is presented as (Cressey, 1951, pp. 577-578): 
 
“Trusted persons become trust violators when: (1) they conceive of them-
selves as having a financial problem which is non-sharable, (2) have the 
knowledge or awareness that this problem can be secretly resolved by viola-
tion of the position of financial trust and (3) are able to apply to their own 
conduct in that situation a verbalization which enables them to adjust their 
conceptions of themselves as trusted person with their conceptions of them-
selves as users of the entrusted funds or property.” 
 
In the context of the current focus on the fraud triangle the three main reasons listed in this article is 
quite interesting. They translate directly into the three elements of incentives, opportunity and rationali-- 27 - 
zation. Thus Cressey is accredited the sociological observations behind the fraud triangle as described 
in ISA 240 and related fraud literature. So, on one hand it is interesting to identify the origin of these 
fundamental observations. On the other hand it could be relevant to ask the question: “what’s new in 
ISA 240”?  
 
As previously mentioned, a new Auditors Act was adopted in 1967, see part I of the historical overview 
in figure 4. This Act did not contain any provisions that were relevant to the auditor’s responsibility in 
relation to fraud either. However, the Act established the disciplinary system that is now an integral part 
of the institutional environment. Specifically, the Act established the first Accountants Tribunal. How-
ever, the functioning of this tribunal was changed in 1993, and the tribunal was ultimately abolished in 
2002.
14 In 1970, another Auditors Act was adopted. This Act established the two-tier system of State 
Authorized and Certified Public Accountants that is still in effect. The activities of State Authorized 
Public Accountants were regulated in the 1967 Act, whereas the activities of Certified Public Account-
ants were regulated in the 1970 Act. However, aside from the educational requirements for becoming a 
State Authorized or Certified Public Accountants, there were few differences between the provisions in 
the 1967 and 1970 Acts. 
 
A common basis for the following time periods is established in this section. In summary, it is not the 
auditor’s main responsibility to detect fraud. If (when) the auditor does detect fraud, he should notify 
the company. This could lead to an extended role of helping to detect the causes behind suspicious 
behaviour. The distinction between the auditors and the criminal investigators´ responsibilities in rela-
tion to fraud can be made from a legal standpoint. In addition, a distinction must be made between 
internal control and the auditors’ control.  
 
                                                 
14 The Accountants Tribunal that was operative from 1967 to 1993 is often labelled ’the old Accountants Tribunal’ whereas 
the tribunal that was operative from 1993 to 2002 is often labelled ’the new Accountants Tribunal’. - 28 - 
 
 
4.2. Audit regulation and fraud cases in the time period 1970-1996  
 
The second time period from 1970 to 1996 introduces regulation that deals specifically with the audi-
tor’s responsibility in relation to fraud. The transition from the first to the second time period reflects a 
codification of good audit practice into regulation, see part II of the historical overview in figure 4. The 
work of the responsum committee led to a few auditing guidelines in the period from 1970 to 1973. 
These precursory guidelines were not as authoritative as the subsequent standards, i.e. the first Danish 
auditing standard was issued by the Auditing Committee in 1978. This standard – RV 1 (1978) – deals 
with the fundamental principles for audits of financial statements.
15  
 
However, one of the precursory guidelines – RV (1970) – is relevant to the auditor’s responsibility in 
relation to fraud. The guideline deals with the fundamental principles for audit of financial statements. 
The auditor’s responsibility in relation to fraud is mentioned in the section of the standard that deals 
with the limitation of the auditor’s and the management’s responsibility. Specifically, the auditor’s re-
sponsibility in relation to fraud is described in the following way in the standard (sections 30-32, in 
translation):  
 
“During his audit, the auditor is aware of the fact that fraud may occur, be-
cause fraud and similar irregularities can have a material effect on the finan-
cial statements and hence his report. However, the audit is not intended to 
detect fraud.” 
 
                                                 
15 Also, the standards were not numbered. - 29 - 
“In his planning, the auditor must take into consideration that fraud is not 
the usual but the unusual case. Furthermore, the means and the circum-
stances that can be used for, or be a cause of, fraud are so multifarious that a 
systematic avoidance of all the possibilities would cause a workload and 
hence costs of impossible size. Thus the auditor must rely on the fact that an 
audit that is planned with the purpose of checking the financial statements, 
combined with ordinary due care, very often will lead to detection if fraud 
occurs, e.g. because the prior experience suggests that such irregularities will 
repeat itself with increasingly greater frequency. However, fraud is best pre-
vented by well-functioning internal control.” 
 
“If the auditor comes across any circumstances that raise his suspicion that 
fraud is occurring he expands his examinations. He reports his findings to 
the competent management and at the same time makes it clear if the cir-
cumstance is so material that it can have an effect on his report on the finan-
cial statements. Finally, it is agreed whether the management or the auditor is 
going to handle the further examinations. Whether the auditor can rely com-
pletely on the management’s examinations and be content with only being 
informed about the result hereof or not will depend on to what extent it is 
possible that any irregularities may have an effect on the financial state-
ments.” 
 
This standard was an important inspiration in the development of RV 1 (1978). Thus there is a high 
degree of conformity between the two standards which has been superseded by RV 1 (1993). Like RV 1 
(1978), this standards deals with the fundamental principles for audits of financial statements. Further-- 30 - 
more, like both RV (1970) and RV 1 (1978), the auditor’s responsibility in relation to fraud is men-
tioned in the section of the standard that deals with the limitation of duties and responsibilities between 
the management and the auditor. Specifically, the auditor’s responsibility in relation to fraud is de-
scribed in the following way in the standard (section 2.7-2.8, in translation):  
 
“The auditor must plan and perform the audit with a view to being able to 
decide if the financial statements contain material errors and mistakes. 
An audit planned and performed in accordance with good auditing practice 
does not provide absolute assurance that any material error and mistake in 
the financial statements is detected.” 
 
“Errors and mistakes in the financial statements can be unintentional or in-
tentional. For example, intentional errors can be the result of fraud or other 
irregularities. Intentional errors and mistakes are usually attempted to be 
concealed or disguised and hence there is an increased risk that the auditor 
do not detect these errors and mistakes. Thus an audit planned and per-
formed in accordance with good auditing practice cannot prevent that such 
material errors and mistakes remain undetected.” 
 
These standards, i.e. RV (1970), RV 1 (1978), and RV 1 (1993), all reflect a reactive approach to the 
auditor’s responsibility in relation to fraud. Thus the standards do not focus on the auditor’s responsi-
bility for proactively detecting fraud during an audit. Instead the standards focus on the auditor’s re-
sponsibility for reacting on fraud in the – presumable rare – case that the auditor accidentally comes 
across a case of fraud during an audit. RV (1970) requires the auditor to be aware of the fact that fraud 
may occur, because fraud and similar irregularities can have a material effect on the financial statements - 31 - 
and hence the auditor’s report. However, it is emphasized that an audit is not intended to detect fraud. 
Similarly, RV 1 (1978) requires the auditor to be aware of the fact that fraud and other irregularities may 
occur, because such circumstances can be important, when evaluating the financial statements. How-
ever, once again it is emphasized that an audit is not intended to prevent or detect fraud or other ir-
regularities. Finally, it is emphasized in RV 1 (1993) that an audit planned and performed in accordance 
with “good auditing practice” cannot prevent that intentional errors and mistakes remain undetected.  
 
In this time period the 1967 and 1970 Acts were changed several times. None of these changes were 
relevant to the auditor’s responsibility in relation to fraud. However, some of the changes are worth 
mentioning anyway. For example, in 1988, the 8th directive was implemented in Danish legislation. 
Furthermore, in 1993, the disciplinary system was changed.  
 
The codification of the auditor’s responsibility in relation to fraud coincides with an increasing number 
of actual fraud cases. We have identified 21 responsum cases, 7 tribunal cases and 2 court cases in the 
time period from 1970 to 1996. In most responsum cases raised in this period the auditor was criti-
cized, i.e. the responsum committee expressed criticism in 86% of the cases as compared to 52% for 
the previous period, see table 2.  
 
The criticism is tied to the newly codified responsibilities to react upon the suspicion of fraud. As such 
the auditor could receive criticism for failure to perform necessary tasks catered to the concrete circum-
stances of the audit and/or for failure to communicate in an appropriate fashion with those charged 
with governance. In seven of the 18 responsum cases with criticism, the responsum committee pointed 
to pure audit failures in the form of insufficient or inappropriately conducted tasks. In the remaining 11 
responsum cases communication failures were part of the audit failures (this break up is not shown in 
table). Examples of audit failures could be drawn from Responsum cases 741 and 910.  - 32 - 
 
In Responsum case 741 (1981), the auditor was criticised on a number of points. The frauds were made 
possible as a result of shortcomings in the administrative procedures for which reason the auditor 
should have performed supplemental audit work such as comparisons, reconciliations and analysis of 
differences between the budget and the financial statements which could have contributed to an earlier 
detection. In Responsum case 910 (1987), the auditor was criticised on a number of points. Among 
other things, the auditor should have audited the balance sheet item accounts receivable and performed 
a review of sales invoices around the balance sheet date. Also, the auditor should have performed un-
announced cash audits for the use of an assessment of the administrative procedures and the internal 
control. Furthermore, the auditor should have compared the registrations in the bookkeeping records 
with statements of accounts from banks. 
 
In these fraud cases, the concrete circumstances of the audit were considered and used in order to as-
sess potential shortcomings of the audit. In a number of the fraud cases the responsum committee also 
reflects on the difficulties involved in detecting fraud. In this time period the audits are not considered 
as audit failures in their entirety.  Instead (usually a few) shortcomings are noticed and commented by 
the responsum committee. This evidently reflects the regulatory requirement that it is not the auditor’s 
main task to detect fraud.   
 
Communication failures in light of frauds are typically tied to the auditor’s responsibility to notify those 
charged with governance about inadequate internal controls. Examples can be drawn from responsum 
case 661 and 868. 
 
In responsum case 661 (1979), the auditor was only criticised on a few points. Among other things, the 
auditor clearly should have explained the shortcomings in the internal control to those charged with - 33 - 
governance and the management and given advice with a view to provision of good internal control. 
The responsum committee explains that it would be reasonable that the auditor in the audit protocol 
had explained the possibilities for fraud (responsum case 661, 1979, p. 3). In a reply, the audit firm ar-
gues that such ”philosophical” considerations are beyond normal audit practice. The responsum com-
mittee retorts that it will not enter into a discussion, but argues that their assessment is related to the 
specific case. Similar in responsum case 868 (1986) where the auditor was only criticised on a few 
points. Among other things, the auditor should have extended his audit and criticised the invoicing 
system and the uncertainty about the financial reporting in the audit protocol. 
 
The communication failures are tied to the official communications between the auditor and the client. 
It should be noted that few Danish companies, including public companies, have established audit 
committees. This may be so for a number of reasons. First, due to the separation of supervisory and 
executive activities, audit committees are hardly as necessary in countries using a two-tier management 
structure as they presumable are in countries using a unified management structure. Second, most Dan-
ish companies are small or medium-sized. Furthermore, due to the Danish two-tier management struc-
ture, boards of directors of Danish companies are generally small, even in public companies. Third, 
traditionally, the auditor has communicated with the board of directors through long form reports, 
which are termed audit protocols.
16 The audit protocol must be presented on every meeting of the 
board of directors. Moreover, entries in the audit protocol must be acknowledged by all members of 
the board, who must sign all entries. 
 
Furthermore, there is a special provision in the Executive Order on Auditors’ Statements mentioned 
above. If the auditor has a justifiable assumption that one or more members of the management or 
                                                 
16 The contents of the audit protocol are regulated in the Auditors Act, in the Executive Order on Auditor’s Statements, and 
RS 210, 260 and 265. RSs 210 and 260 correspond to ISA 210 and 260. RS 265, on the other hand, is a special Danish audit-
ing standard that deals exclusively with the auditor’s communication of audit matters with those charged with governance 
through the audit protocol. Thus there are some overlap between this standard and RSs 210 and 260. - 34 - 
those charged with governance may be held legally liable due to circumstances related to the company, 
the auditor must modify the auditor’s report by adding an emphasis of matter paragraph. The provision 
comprises both criminal liability and civil liability.  
 
The auditor’s responsibility to communicate with those charged with governance is an ongoing process. 
In the responsum case 1007 (1993, p. 3, in translation) the committee noted that: 
 
“If the management – after the auditor has pointed to weaknesses in the in-
ternal control – does not take precautions to eliminate the weaknesses, the 
auditor must point to the weaknesses again. However, it is assumed that the 
auditor – during his audit of the items concerned – has used such a combina-
tion of audit procedures that he has reached a reasonable assurance about 
the accuracy of the financial statements. Otherwise, this should be reflected 
in the audit report.” 
 
Hence, in relation to absent or weak internal controls, the auditor has the responsibility to notify those 
charged with governance, to repeat the message if it is an unsolved problem, and to plan the audit 
choosing audit tasks which duly reflect the weaknesses. In this fraud case – where the cash clerk was 
later convicted for embezzlement – the responsum committee also addressed the question of when the 
auditor should react. The responsum committee responds confirming on the following direct question 
in Responsum case 1007 (1993, in translation):  
 
“Should an auditor – when a suspicion about irregularities arises – react 
without hesitation in order to dismiss or confirm the suspicion”?. 
 - 35 - 
This is a clear change from the previous time period, where Responsum case 172 (1952) case was cited 
for not criticizing the auditor for half a year´s delay. 
 
As opposed to the criticism raised by the responsum committee, real sanctions against auditors in fraud 
cases are restricted to the tribunal cases and court cases, see figure 1. In the period from 1970 to 1996 
we have identified nine such cases, see table 3 for an overview. Here it is noticeable that fraud cases 
where the auditor’s responsibility is questioned almost exclusively are tied to management frauds, that 
is, cases with fraudulent reporting or misappropriation of assets with concealment through the book-
keeping. 
 
<Insert “Table 3. Fraud cases and auditor sanctions in the time period 1970-1996” about here>  
 
 
Whether the auditor has a special responsibility to detect fraud has been considered explicitly by the 
Accountants Tribunal in three cases involving fraudulent reporting (Tribunal cases 2, 3 and 5). In tri-
bunal case 5 (1994) the auditor was acquitted. In this fraud case, the perpetrator was the CEO who had 
been found guilty and penalised with one and a half years´ imprisonment by the court system. The tri-
bunal explains that the auditor had had special reasons to be aware of the possibility of fraud, but his 
opportunity to detect the fraud had been limited, and therefore should be considered free from sanc-
tions. Tribunal case 5 (1994, 3, in translation):  
 
“In the opinion of the tribunal these circumstances should have given the 
defendant a cause for special scepticism. 
However, if there is no basis for determining that the defendant by a further 
examination, including a questioning of the company’s manager, would have - 36 - 
been able to detect the falsifications, and if  the information about the ex-
pansion of the company in 1985 can have made the defendant’s lack of ob-
servation that there was something unusual understandable, the tribunal does 
not find that it is possible to determine with the necessary assurance that the 
defendant has acted in a way that should be sanctioned according to the 
Auditors Act §19, now §18a, as far as this item of complaint is concerned. 
As a consequence, the defendant must be acquitted from all the complaints.” 
 
 
In contrast, the auditor was sanctioned with a fine of the amount of DKK25,000 which constitutes half 
of the maximum fine of the time
17 (tribunal case 3, 1990, p. 4, in translation):  
 
“The tribunal agrees with the defendant that it has not rested upon him as an 
audit responsibility to detect illegal acts which have been concealed from 
him, but the tribunal finds that the defendant has the responsibility that the 
external audit has not exercised adequate care with regard to the building 
loans whose balances to an uncertain extent must be presumed to have indi-
cated that advance loans had been taken without it being ensured that the 
corresponding guarantees issued by the bank were recorded.” 
 
This instance of fraudulent reporting was one of the highly public fraud cases involving the financial 
crash of a smaller bank (6. juli banken). The Danish Commerce and Companies Agency had brought 
the case before the Accountants Tribunal to elicit an expert opinion on the auditors’ responsibilities 
including the potential liability. Here the Accountants Tribunal explicitly states that the auditor does not 
                                                 
17 The national currency “Danish Kroner” is abbreviated DKK. The current exchange rate is approximately 7.50 DKK to 1 
Euro. - 37 - 
have a special responsibility to detect the fraud. The sanction awarded the auditor is for inadequate 
awareness in relation to particular loans. That is, a shortcoming in the audit conducted but not an over-
all audit failure. A very similar reasoning can be found in tribunal case 2 (1989). This was a case of 
fraudulent reporting for the purpose of obtaining illegal export grants from the government. The audi-
tor in this case received criticism by the Responsum Committee (responsum case 886, 1986) and was 
sanctioned with a warning by the Accountants Tribunal (tribunal case 2, 1989). Hence, there the short-
coming was considered minor in comparison with the audit of the bank mentioned above.  
 
Sanctions against the auditor were also awarded in the one fraud case in table 3 involving misappropria-
tion of assets by an employee. The High Court found that the auditor ought to have uncovered a year-
long embezzlement scheme by a bookkeeper (Court case 4, 1995). However, this does not suggest a 
change in the auditor’s responsibilities. By his admission this was an audit failure in relation to pay-
ments to suppliers. Sufficient audit acts would in these particular circumstances have lead to the detec-
tion of more outgoing payments than appropriate. Therefore the High Court found the auditor liable to 
cover the defrauded amount of DKK483,457.  
 
A couple of the cases in this time period addressed the auditor’s responsibility to consider such discre-
tions by management or those charged with governance in which they might be held legally liable. This 
could, for example, be related to illegal loans obtained by this group of people. In tribunal case 1 (1976) 
the auditor was sanctioned a fine of DKK2,000 by the Accountants Tribunal for not disclosing the 
information related to inappropriate withdrawal by a manager. In the consideration of these fraud cases 
the criminal acts have all been classified as concealments by management. Near the end of time period 
the fine to the auditor, for not disclosing an illegal loan, was DKK10,000 (tribunal case 6, 1994). In the 
following time period from 1996 to 2006 this type of offence was the sole reason for awarding sanc-
tions against the auditor no less than seven times (i.e. the tribunal cases 8 through 12, 15 and 17).   - 38 - 
 
Two of the responsum cases in this time period stand out in terms of size, namely responsum cases 
1028 (1991) and 1044 (1995). Both are related to fraud cases with considerable public interest and sub-
sequent legal scrutiny of the fraudulent reporting pertaining to these cases. Responsum case 1028 
(1991) was raised to obtain an expert opinion for the use in a criminal case raised at the district court 
(here referred to as court case 3 (1994)). The case involved C&G Banken which had filed for suspen-
sion of payments on October 28
th 1987 and later been declared bankrupt. Three different themes were 
raised in the responsum case, namely (1) Audit of the foreign branch in C&G Banken, (2) Audit of 
guaranties, and (3) Review of a prospect for new share capital dated July 28
th 1987. Here the auditors 
received criticism related to the first two. The audit of the foreign branch involved insufficient audit 
acts for an area of the bank with poor internal controls. The audit of the guarantee obligations was also 
insufficient and the size of the amounts could involve a material risk for the company. Hence, the area 
should have been mentioned in the audit reports for 1985 and 1986. In the district court (court case 3 
(1994), the criminal liability sanction against the auditors was 20 daily fines of the amount of 
DKK2,000 for each of the four auditors involved. Although it was the first time auditors were sen-
tenced to daily fines for breach of the criminal code for gross negligence in their auditing, the verdict 
still must be regarded as relatively mild, considering the magnitude of their faults, and the impact that 
these faults had on the sequence of the events.  
 
Responsum case 1044 (1995) involved the major corporate fraud scandal in newer history involving the 
Nordic Feather Company. The fraudulent reporting was initiated by the charismatic and dominant 
leader of the listed company who held a combined position as Head of the board and CEO. In 1990 
the company was declared bankrupt – at that time the leader had committed suicide. The bankrupt 
estate was met with claims for more than 2 billion DKK. The trust in the auditor profession became a 
public issue. It was difficult for the public to understand how the company could receive unqualified - 39 - 
audit opinions for a number of years, also after the auditors had been aware of major problems, includ-
ing the apparent signalling effect by auditor resignations. This responsum case was raised upon request 
of the public prosecutor in 1994. The purpose was to elicit an expert opinion on good audit practice as 
well as good accounting practice for the use in criminal prosecution initiated at the District Court. The 
responsum committee responded with harsh criticism of the accounting practices involving numerous 
accounts of inflated assets and other accounting discretions. On no less than ten of 14 specific issues 
raised the auditors were criticized for not issuing qualified audit opinions. In these instances as well as 
the remaining four issues the auditors were criticized for insufficient audit acts and/or lack of audit 
documentation.  
 
The fraud case continued for several years in the court systems ending with a High Court decision 
against management and auditors (court case 7, 1998). Members of management were sentenced to 
several years of imprisonment for gross fraud against investors and creditors. As indicated in table 4 in 
the next section, two of the three auditors involved were found criminal liable and sanctioned with 
fines. In the related case, the Supreme Court ruled in favour of two resigning auditors (court case 10, 
2004). The two auditors had been appointed in 1987 and resigned in 1988 without auditing the com-
pany. The Supreme Court finally acquitted the two resigning auditors for civil liability towards the 
shareholders.  
 
The public and political interest in this case brought a number of regulatory changes which are directly 
attributable to this fraud. This type of reaction to fraud scandals has been observed many times, e.g. the 
recent regulatory changes in the wake of the Enron scandal. As indicated in figure 4, the audit law was 
changed in 1994 and the executive order concerning the auditors report was changed in 1996. The 
company act also implemented certain restrictions in 1996. Among the changes – branded in the public 
as “lex Nordic Feather” – is a band against a combined position as Chairman of board and CEO (as - 40 - 
had been the case in Nordic Feather, but in very few other companies) and the requirement that all 
board members should sign the audit protocol (at board meetings the leader in Nordic Feather had 
been reported to only read aloud passages from the audit protocol which he found relevant). 
  
In summary the time period from 1970 to 1996 was dominated by codification of “good audit prac-
tice”. Hence, the auditors’ reactive responsibilities in relation to fraud were introduced in the general 
audit standards. The period had a number of serious fraud cases in terms of high public and political 
awareness, but it is noticeable that the sanctions against auditors were not toughened beyond the pro-
portional size of the cases.  
 
 
4.3. Audit regulation and fraud cases in the time period 1996-2006 
 
This section provides a description of the relevant audit regulation in the period from around 1996 
until today.  In this period the proactive approach to the auditor’s responsibility to detect fraud was 
introduced in the audit regulation in Denmark, i.e. starting by an Executive Order on Auditors’ State-
ments issued in 1996. One of the provisions in this Executive Order provides that the auditor, when 
planning and performing the audit, to a certain extent must be aware of circumstances that are indica-
tive of fraud and other irregularities and that are of importance to the users of financial statements.
18 
Furthermore, the provision was the first provision in the legislation that deals specifically with the audi-
tor’s responsibility in relation to fraud. 
 
                                                 
18 Specifically, the provision provides the following: ’In connection with this [i.e., when planning and performing the audit], 
the auditor to a certain extent must be aware of circumstances that are indicative of fraud and other irregularities and that 
are of importance to the users of financial statements’. - 41 - 
This provision predates RV 21 (1999) by a few years. RV 21 was inspired by the American SAS 82 
(1997) and is the first Danish auditing standard that deals exclusively with the auditor’s responsibility in 
this area. RV 21 also reflects the more proactive approach to the auditor’s responsibility in relation to 
fraud. Thus this standard focuses on the auditor’s responsibility for proactively detecting fraud during 
an audit – not just the auditor’s responsibility for reacting on fraud in the – presumably rare – case that 
the auditor accidentally comes across a case of fraud during an audit.  
 
In the United States, the auditor’s responsibility in relation to fraud is regulated in the Statement on 
Auditing Standard (SAS) 99 from 2002. ISA 240 (revised 2004) and SAS 99 were prepared by the joint 
efforts of the IAASB and the Auditing Standards Board (ASB). Therefore there are only differences in 
terminology, but no material differences between the two standards. However, due to different tradi-
tions of the structure and layout of auditing standards between the IAASB and the ASB, the standards 
are not directly comparable.
19  
 
As indicated in the overview in figure 4, RV 21 (1999) was succeeded by auditing standard (Revisions 
Standard – RS) 240 from 2003. This standard was effective for audits of financial statements for peri-
ods beginning on or after July 1, 2003. The purpose of the standard was to provide guidance on the 
auditor’s responsibility to consider fraud and error in an audit of financial statements. Danish auditing 
standards are now based on the International Standards on Auditing (ISAs) that are issued by the In-
ternational Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB). The international standards are trans-
lated section by section and only any special regulations in the Danish legislation are added. Thus most 
of the Danish standards and the international standards are directly comparable. RS 240 was based on 
the corresponding ISA 240 from 2001. The overall value of Danish auditing standards as a source of 
regulation is that the auditor must perform audits in accordance with the standards. 
                                                 
19 In comparison, ISA 240 (revised 2004) consists of 112 sections and 3 appendices, whereas SAS No. 99 consists of (only) 
84 sections and 1 appendix (and 1 exhibit on management antifraud programs and controls). - 42 - 
 
The purpose of the revised standard (ISA 240 (2004)/RS 240 (2006)) is (1) to provide guidance on the 
auditor’s responsibility to consider fraud in an audit of financial statements and (2) to expand on how 
the regulations in ISA 315 and ISA 330 are to be applied in relation to the risks of material misstate-
ments resulting from fraud. The audit risk standards comprise the risk of material misstatements in the 
financial statements whether caused by fraud or error. ISA 240 (revised 2004), on the other hand, com-
prises only the risk of material misstatements resulting from fraud. Thus this standard can be viewed as 
an elaborated interpretation of the general audit risk standards with regard to the risk of fraud.  
 
In the first section of ISA 240 (revised), it is emphasized that the guidance provided in the standard is 
intended to be integrated into the overall audit process. Thus the auditor’s work in relation to fraud 
must be an integral part of all audits. However, the standard does not change the auditor’s overall re-
sponsibility in relation to fraud. Thus, again it is provided that the auditor’s responsibility is to provide 
reasonable assurance that the financial statements taken as a whole are from material misstatements 
whether caused by fraud or error. On the other hand, on the concrete level, the standard implies a 
number of changes related to the fulfilling of this responsibility throughout the audit process.  
 
As mentioned, the Danish Auditors Act was changed fundamentally in 2003. One of the important 
changes was that provisions were introduced, which impose an obligation on auditors of notification of 
management fraud.
20 The conditions of this obligation are (1) that one or more members of the man-
agement or those charged with governance are committing or previously have committed fraud related 
to the company and (2) that the auditor has a justifiable assumption that the fraud is concerned with a 
substantial amount or in other ways is of gross significance. On these conditions the auditor must no-
tify each member of the management and those charged with governance. If the management and 
                                                 
20 These provisions originate from a report from the so-called Brydensholt Commission (1999).  - 43 - 
those charged with governance have not taken action on the fraud and documented this action within a 
period of two weeks, the auditor must notify the public prosecutor. In Denmark, there is a special de-
partment of the public prosecutor that deals exclusively with financial crime and fraud. If the auditor 
assesses that a notification of the management and those charged with governance is unsuited to pre-
vent any further fraud – for example if the majority of the members of the management know about or 
are involved in the fraud – the auditor must notify the public prosecutor immediately. 
 
This obligation of notification of management fraud constitutes an important limitation to the auditor’s 
otherwise far-reaching professional secrecy. For example, ISA 240 (revised) provides that the auditor’s 
professional duty to maintain the confidentiality of client information ordinarily precludes reporting 
fraud (or error) to a party outside the company. However, it is recognized that the auditor’s profes-
sional secrecy may be overridden by the law or courts of law. It is also emphasized that the auditor 
must consider seeking legal advice before reporting to a party outside the company, in this case the 
public prosecutor. These general provisions reflect the fact that the auditor’s professional secrecy and 
the exceptions to this secrecy are weighted differently in different countries. In Denmark, the auditor’s 
professional secrecy is rather comprehensive, but there are a number of exceptions. The obligation of 
notification of management fraud reflects one of the more notable exceptions. 
 
However, it is important to bear in mind that the obligation comprises only management fraud, not 
employee fraud. As mentioned, management fraud is defined as fraud involving one or more members 
of the management or those charged with governance, whereas employee fraud is defined as fraud in-
volving only employees. 
 
The fact that the auditor has a certain responsibility in relation to fraud is emphasized by a provision in 
the 2004 Executive Order on Auditors’ Statements. Here it is provided that the auditor, throughout the - 44 - 
audit process and to a certain extent, must be aware of circumstances that are indicative of fraud or 
other irregularities that are of importance to users of financial statements. However, the level of assur-
ance that is required by the provision in the Executive Order is lower than the reasonable assurance 
that was introduced by RV 21 (1999) and that is now required by ISA 240 (revised). Thus the provision 
in the Executive Order is now of little significance. 
 
The empirical findings available for the period 1996 to 2006 are based on an increased number of fraud 
cases relative to the time span. In eight of the 11 responsum cases criticism was raised by the respon-
sum committee, see table 3 for a comparison with previous time periods. This is the first period with 
specific regulatory requirements for the auditor’s responsibilities in relation to fraud. The earliest refer-
ence to the new RV21 (1999) is found in responsum case 1181 (2001, p. 2, in translation): 
 
“In Auditing Guideline 21 [RV 21] it is stated that if the auditor during his 
audit detects any transactions that could give reason for a presumption that 
there was a risk of fraudulent acts, the audit must be extended to clarify this. 
It is noted that this guideline is effective from 1999, but according to the 
committee the guideline conforms to the guidelines for good audit practice 
in the period concerned.” 
 
It should be noted that here the responsum committee is considering a possible reaction to fraud detec-
tion that is very similar to earlier references to RV1 related to the overall and not specific responsibility 
of the auditor. In the majority of the fraud cases, the responsum committee actually refers to RV1 and 
not RV21. In this sense, the criticism raised in this time period does not seem to change dramatically. 
This also raises the question about what should be covered by a normal audit. The responsum cases - 45 - 
deal with this in various ways. In responsum case 1151 (2000, p. 1, in translation) the auditor under 
scrutiny argues along the lines found in the past:  
 
“It is noted that the auditor in the audit protocol dated on March 11 1991 
has stated that “it is not the main purpose of the audit to detect frauds and 
irregularities” and that “If any inaccuracies are detected during the audit, the 
audit will be extended to clarify this.” 
 
The responsum committee counters with criticism based on the new proactive responsibilities, i.e. iden-
tifying an audit plan failure (responsum case 1151, 2000, p. 1, in translation): 
 
“In the specific case it is the committee’s opinion that the present audit plans 
are adequate for an overall planning of the audit, but that the audit plan 
should have included a review of the internal control in the company, as far 
as salaries are concerned. This would have revealed that the management had 
not established an appropriate control of the salaries paid out.” 
 
Hence, here the responsibility to plan for the possibility of fraud is considered in the specific context of 
auditing the payroll and personnel cycle. The potential shortcomings in the course of an audit are now 
more regularly tied to the responsibility for planning. Audit planning is no new invention, but now the 
wording of the responsum committee´s criticism is addressing this explicitly. In the latest fraud case 
available from the responsum committee, it also addresses the issue of an extension of the audit as a 
reaction upon fraud suspicion. Responsum case 1239 (2005, p. 1, in translation):  
 - 46 - 
“.. [I]t is the management that has the responsibility to establish administra-
tive procedures and good internal control. It is the auditor’s task to confirm 
this. However, it is the committee’s opinion that the auditor should have 
checked that agreed initiatives with a view to strengthening the administra-
tive procedures and the internal controls had been implemented. … [T]he 
fact that the auditor may not have complied with good auditing practice on 
certain points does not entail that the auditor loses the right to a fee for as-
sistance with the detection of fraud.” 
 
It is noticeable that the extension of the audit to examine the particular circumstances indicated by 
fraud suspicions is not considered as part of the normal audit. The solving of the crime may be a task 
where the auditor is considered to have a natural advantage, but this is not necessarily a part of the au-
dit task for which the auditor will receive the audit fee. This is a task beyond the financial audit.  
 
An overall assessment of the responsum cases belonging to this time period is that no major changes 
have been identified. In spite of new regulation suggesting a more proactive role of the auditor in rela-
tion to fraud, it has been the same type of problems and the same type of case handling as in previous 
time periods.  
 
What has changed dramatically is the increase in the number of fraud cases. Especially the number of 
tribunal cases has been considerable. In effect, there have been 12 fraud cases in the last decade as 
compared to seven in the initial 26 years of the lifetime of the tribunals. As indicated in table 4, seven 
of the 12 cases have lead to sanctions, because of the explicit requirement to communicate about illegal 
loans. Particulars on the remaining cases are shown in table 4. The five tribunal cases are worth examin-
ing in detail because of the clear indication of auditor responsibility.  - 47 - 
 
<Insert Table 4. Fraud cases and auditor sanctions in the time period 1996-2006 about here. > 
 
The two examples of fraudulent reporting by management have lead to higher fines to the auditors 
than previously seen, see tribunal cases 14 and 19. The size of the fine in tribunal case 14 (2001) was 
considerably higher than previously seen. Although high, a fine of DKK100,000 is still just one third of 
the fine maximum available at that time. Fines of that relative magnitude had been used before. The list 
of shortcomings related to the audit is considerable and includes elements related to audit planning, 
conduct, documentation and communication. It is suggested that many of the particular issues in the 
fraudulent reporting would be apparent, if the auditor had conducted the audit in accordance with 
“good audit practice”. The fraudulent reporting includes examples of double counting of company cars, 
wrongful inclusion of property, overvaluation of assets, missing liabilities, etc. In the latest tribunal case 
the fines to the two auditors involved were even higher, i.e. disciplinary sanctions amounting to DKK. 
150,000 and 140,000 respectively in tribunal case 19 (2006). Much similar to what is seen in the respon-
sum cases of this time period, the tribunal court is considering the importance of audit planning with 
explicit references to RV1, RV14, RV17 and RV18, but not RV21. Planning the audit is seen as an in-
dispensable prerequisite for an appropriate audit and therefore presumably also for any fraud detection 
by the part of the auditor. Similar remarks are made in tribunal case 16 (2005) which involves a pure 
case of employee concealment made possible by insufficient separation of duties. In this case the tribu-
nal sanctions the auditor with a fine of DKK75,000 due to inappropriate audit planning (tribunal case 
16, 2005, 3).  
 
The size of the fines suggests different circumstances in each of the disciplinary cases. The two exam-
ples involving fraudulent reporting lead to relatively higher fines than the cases involving concealments, 
see table 4. It should be noted that the fine of DKK25,000 in tribunal case 13 relates to a fraud case - 48 - 
involving criminal charges made against both management and the auditor. Part of the circumstances is 
outdated, while the part considered by the tribunal dates back to 1991 and 1992, where the maximum 
fine would have been DKK50,000. This is considered explicitly in the decision of the tribunal court. In 
comparison, the sanction of DKK10,000 in the employee concealment case found in tribunal case 18 
(2006) should be considered as being considerably less harsh. 
 
Finally, we consider the circumstances of the fraud cases from 1996 to 2006 as handled in the court 
system. All but one of the seven court cases in this period are related to management frauds. Court 
cases 7 and 10 have been mentioned in the previous section as they are related to the fraud case in the 
Nordic Feather company. The only court case involving criminal liability is the one involving the three 
auditors prosecuted in court case 7. The remaining fraud cases are civil liability cases raised on the part 
of stockholders or other plaintiffs assuming that they have suffered an economic loss, e.g. because the 
auditor has been negligent in performing an audit or another type of engagement. In court cases 6 and 
10, the auditors were acquitted for neglect. The particular reasoning in court case 6 was shortly men-
tioned earlier. That is, the ruling in favour of the auditor due to the absence of a responsum explaining 
the particular responsibilities in relation to an audit of related companies within a group.  
 
The size of the civil liability should not be seen as a measure for the severity of the sanction. The 
amount awarded in court cases 5, 8, 9 and 11 reflects the economic loss by the part of the plaintiffs due 
to neglect by the part of the auditors, see table 4. In each of the cases where civil liability is found a 
responsum has been used as part of the court ruling showing auditor neglect. 
 
The criminal acts by management actually predate the new responsibilities of the auditors in court cases 
5 and 8. In court case 5 (1997) management had issued fictitious invoices to their factoring service 
company. The auditor’s responsibility had been expressed in the criticism raised in responsum case 938 - 49 - 
(1989). The responsum committee found shortcomings in the audit as compared to an appropriate au-
dit, e.g. lack of sampling tests controlling for the existence of real deliveries behind hypothecated in-
voices and lack of confirmation letters to debtors. In the premises of the court case it is assumed that 
the bank involved would have refused further use of the credit facilities if appropriate information on 
the circumstances of the company had been provided to them. The neglect by the auditor as compared 
to an appropriate audit was sufficient to find him liable in this fraud case. Court case 8 (1999) is a 
somewhat similar instance of fraudulent reporting. In accordance with responsum case 1049 (1995) the 
High Court found that the auditor involved had incurred civil liability and was sentenced to pay damage 
to the plaintiffs (i.e. to the factoring company in the amount of DKK922,108.08 and to the bank in the 
amount of DKK1,531,820.71. In the premises for the court decision it is stated that the auditor is not 
reproached for not detecting fictitious invoices as part of the management fraud scheme. However due 
to clear demonstrated shortcomings of the audit, the financial statements have portrayed a too positive 
picture of the actual financial circumstances. Due to the responsibility to provide an opinion as to the 
true and fair view of the financial statements, the auditor was found liable in relation to both plaintiffs.  
 
The two remaining fraud cases both provide examples of auditor’s neglect in relation to sufficiently 
checking the internal control systems of the clients. Court case 9 (2003) involved a concealment fraud 
committed by an employee. The Supreme Court ruled in accordance with the criticism raised by the 
responsum committee in responsum case 1151 (2000). The premises of the ruling indicate that the 
auditor should have a) examined the internal controls which would have revealed that management had 
not established appropriate controls in relation to payment of salaries, and b) communicated the weak-
nesses of the internal controls to those charged with governance as well as describing appropriate 
measures to improve the control systems. The Supreme Court found that the auditor was liable to pay 
damages to the plaintiffs because the neglect could be directly associated with absence of preventive - 50 - 
measures against this particular fraud. Hence, here the proactive role of the auditor in relation to fraud 
is extended considerably as compared to previous interpretations of fraud responsibilities.  
 
Court case 11 has been classified as an example of misappropriation in stead of concealment. This is a 
somewhat arbitrary classification because the main problem here is the elaborate absence of bookkeep-
ing in the company. A point of criticism of the auditor had been expressed by the responsum commit-
tee in responsum case 1213 (2003). The auditor should have made sure that the accounting system and 
internal controls were established and functioning in this investment company. The premises of the 
Supreme Court are clear, i.e. Court case 11 (2006, p. 17) refers directly to RV1 paragraph 6; Due to the 
lack of bookkeeping and financial reporting the auditor should have planed the audit in accordance 
with an assessment of the risk of errors as being relatively high. The lack of inspection constituted such 
an audit failure that the auditor and the audit firm were found liable to pay damages to the plaintiff in 
the amount of highest amount to date, namely DKK8 million.    
 
In summary the time period 1996 to 2006 has been dominated by a codification of international stan-
dards to Danish standards with a focus on proactive responsibilities. The fraud cases have been numer-
ous and lead to higher fines and civil liabilities. 





The purpose of this paper has been to contribute to an understanding of the relationship between audit 
regulation and developments in audit practice in relation to the fraud issue. The contribution of this 
paper involves insight into an interesting audit market with a historical tradition for mandatory audits 
of not only listed companies, but all limited liability companies. The institutional setup has allowed in-
sight into fraud cases, where the auditor’s responsibility has been questioned for a time period which 
reaches back to the start of the audit profession in the beginning of the last century. 
 
The dataset includes all publicized cases raised against Danish auditors within the time period of 1909 
to 2006, i.e. 72 unique fraud cases in total. The overall finding is that the auditors’ responsibilities are 
tied to what constitutes a good audit. In the first time period until 1970, the exact nature and extent of 
a good audit was not completely clear before it was interpreted by the responsum system. It was clear 
that it was not the auditor’s main responsibility to detect fraud and the responsum cases of the time 
demonstrate that the auditor was criticised in fewer cases as compared to the later time periods. The 
responsibility to prevent fraud is clearly placed with management and this includes the responsibility to 
set up a system of internal controls.  
 
The time period from 1970 to 1996 was dominated by codification of “good audit practice”. Hence, the 
auditors’ reactive responsibilities in relation to fraud were introduced in the general audit standards. 
The period had a number of serious fraud cases in terms of high public and political awareness, but it is 
noticeable that the sanctions against auditors were not toughened beyond the proportional size of the 
cases.  - 52 - 
 
The time period 1996 to 2006 has been dominated by a codification of international standards to Dan-
ish standards with a focus on proactive responsibilities. The fraud cases have been numerous and lead 
to higher fines and civil liabilities. The responsibilities of the auditor in relation to fraud should thus be 
interpreted as the development of what constitutes a good audit. In the responsum, tribunal and court 
cases the criticism against the auditor has been based on shortcomings of the audits either in the form 
of inappropriate/insufficient audit tasks or related to failures of communication. The auditor is never 
reprimanded or punished for not detecting frauds as such, but criticism is raised whenever audits have 
been found to be of substandard. The increased number of specific audit standards, including standards 
on the responsibilities to consider fraud, constitutes a more detailed benchmark for good audits than 
ever seen before. The development in sanctions and civil liabilities confirms that the court system is 
now considering fraud as a normal, although unusual, business scenario toward which the auditor has 
proactive responsibilities when planning and conducting the audit.   - 53 - 
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Figure 4. Timeline for audit regulation and fraud casesTable. 1 Fraud types and Perpetrators (unique cases)
Management Employees External Party Collusion Total
Fraudulent Reporting 11 11
Misappropriation of Assets
    Pure cases 2 7 2 11
    Cases with concealment 23 25 2 50








Management 7 (71%) 9 (89%) 4 (75%) 20 (80%)
Employee 13 (46%) 10 (90%) 7 (71%) 30 (67%)
Collusion 1 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (0%)
External 0 (0%) 2 (50%) 0 (0%) 2 (50%)
Total 21 (52%) 21 (86%) 11 (73%) 53 (70%)Table 3. Sanctions against auditors in fraud cases 1970-1996
Case id Type of Court/Tribunal Fraud typeP e r petrator Auditor Responsibility
Tribunal case 1 (1976) Accountants Tribunal Concealment Management Disciplinary sanction: fine (amount DKK. 2,000)
Tribunal case 2 (1989) Accountants Tribunal Fraudulent reporting Management Disciplinary sanction: warning
Tribunal case 3 (1990) Accountants Tribunal Fraudulent reporting Management Disciplinary sanction: fine (amount DKK. 25,000)
Tribunal case 4 (1993) Accountants Tribunal Concealment Collusion Disciplinary sanction: warning
Tribunal case 5 (1994) Accountants Tribunal Fraudulent reporting Management No disciplinary sanction
Tribunal case 6 (1994) Disciplinary Tribunal Concealment Management Disciplinary sanction: fine (amount DKK. 10,000)
Tribunal case 7 (1995) Disciplinary Tribunal Concealment Management Disciplinary sanction: fine (amount DKK. 10,000)
Court case 3 (1994) District Court Fraudulent reporting Management Criminal liability sanction (20 day-fines of amount 
DKK. 2,000 for each of the four auditors)
Court case 4 (1995) High Court Misappropriation Employee Civil liability sanction (amount DKK. 483,457)Table 4. Sanctions against auditors in fraud cases 1996-2006 (without illegal loans)
Case id Type of Court/Tribunal Fraud typeP e r petrator Auditor Responsibility
Tribunal case 13 (1999) Disciplinary Tribunal Concealement Management Disciplinary sanction: fine (amount DKK. 25.000)
Tribunal case 14 (2001) Accountants Tribunal Fraudulent Reporting Management Disciplinary sanction: fine (amount DKK. 100.000)
Tribunal case 16 (2005) Disciplinary Tribunal Concealement Employee Disciplinary sanction: fine (amount DKK. 75,000)
Tribunal case 18 (2006) Disciplinary Tribunal Concealement Employee Disciplinary sanction: fine (amount DKK. 10,000)
Tribunal case 19 (2006) Disciplinary Tribunal Fraudulent Reporting Management
Disciplinary sanction: fines (amounts DKK. 
150.000 and 140.000)
Court case 5 (1997) Supreme Court Fraudulent Reporting Management Civil liability sanction (amount DKK. 543,497)
Court case 6 (1997) High Court Concealement Management No civil liability
Court case 7 (1998) High Court Fraudulent Reporting Management
Criminal liability sanction (auditor 1: 20 day-fines 
of amount DKK. 2,000, auditor 2: 10 day-fines of 
amount DKK. 2,000 and auditor 3: acquittal)
Court case 8 (1999) High Court Fraudulent Reporting Management
Civil liability sanction (amounts DKK. 922,108.98 
and 1,531,820.71)
Court case 9 (2003) Supreme Court Concealement Employee
Civil liability sanction (amounts DKK. 374,584.64 
and 43,750)
Court case 10 (2004) Supreme Court Fraudulent Reporting Management No civil liability
Court case 11 (2006) Supreme Court
Misappropriation of 
assets
Management Civil liability sanction (amount DKK. 8,000,000)
 +7 illegal loans (tribunal cases 8,9,10,11,12,15,17)Working Papers from Accounting Research Group 
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